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This article exploits a quasi-experimental setting to estimate the im-
pact that a commonly used performance-related pay scheme had on
branch performance in a large distribution ﬁrm. The scheme, which
is based on the Balanced Scorecard, was implemented in all branches
in one division but not in another. Branches from the second division
are used as a control group. Our results suggest that the Balanced
Scorecard had some impact but that it varied with branch charac-
teristics, and, in particular, branches with more experienced managers
were better able to respond to the new incentives.
I. Introduction
Many organizations provide some form of performance-related pay to
managers and workers, and its use has increased overtime(see,e.g.,Lazear
and Shaw 2007; and Lemieux, Macleod, and Parent 2007). What form
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should such incentives take? This is the topic of many papers in the
economic and management literatures. A well-known theoretical result
(Holmstrom 1982; Baker, Jensen, and Murphy 1988; Holmstrom and Mil-
grom 1991; Baker 1992) suggests that workers should not be made jointly
responsible for single tasks because sharing responsibility increases the
total risk that each worker faces of successfully completing the task with-
out increasing the beneﬁt. Holmstrom and Milgrom also suggestthattasks
should be grouped together based on the cost of measuring and rewarding
performance. Some workers should do the easy-to-measure tasks, and
their pay should be contingent on performance, while other workers
should focus on hard-to-measure tasks and receive ﬁxed wages. This is
because, if a worker has both easy and hard-to-measure tasks, they will
concentrate on the easy-to-measure tasks at the expense of the hard-to-
measure tasks.
However, one of the most widely used measurement and incentive
schemes—the Balanced Scorecard—runs counter to these results.TheBal-
anced Scorecard was introduced by Kaplan and Norton (1992), and var-
iants of it have been adopted by many large ﬁrms and organizations across
the globe.
1 It was one of the ﬁrst of a new type of performance-related
pay scheme, now more common, that makes use of the greater amount
of information ﬁrms have due to advances in technology (see, inter alia,
Lazear 2001; Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 2002; Acemoglu et al.
2007; and Lazear and Shaw 2007). The idea behind the Balanced Scorecard
is that managers can improve performance by monitoring and rewarding
a range of linked activities (usually 15–20 covering four different per-
spectives—ﬁnancial, customer, internal, and innovation/learning). These
activities are chosen to reﬂect both current actions that affect future per-
formance and the outcomes of past actions. Performance is typically eval-
uated at the group level (e.g., business unit, branch, or team) and incentive
payments are often based on group performance. As well as forming the
ical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) through Advanced Institute of Manage-
ment Research (AIM). All errors and omissions remain the responsibility of the
authors. Contact the corresponding author, Rachel Grifﬁth, at rgrifﬁth@ifs.org
.uk.
1 The most recent evidence is contained in Neely, Yaghi, and Youell (2008).
Other data are available in the Balanced Scorecard Hall of Fame at http://www
.bscol.com/pdf/BSCHoFMembersby_Industry_20002005.pdf; or see Gates
(1999), who surveys 113 “leading” U.S., European, and Asian companies and
ﬁnds that 81% of respondents use a strategic performance measurement system.
Maisel (2001) samples 1990 U.S. management accountants and ﬁnds that 47% of
respondents use a strategic performance measurement system. Rigby (2001) sur-
veys 214 North American ﬁrms and ﬁnds that 44% of organizations use the
Balanced Scorecard; Speckbacher, Bischof, and Pfeiffer (2003) estimate that 26%
of ﬁrms in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria use the Balanced Scorecard; Marr
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basis for a performance-related pay scheme, the Balanced Scorecard also
provides information to managers and workers: “The Balanced Scorecard
is like the dials in an airplane cockpit: it gives managers complex infor-
mation at a glance” (Kaplan and Norton 1992, 71).
Besides running counter to results from the economics literature, the
use and effectiveness of the Balanced Scorecard has been criticized in the
management literature.
2 In particular, Jensen (2001) argues that the Bal-
anced Scorecard will do nothing to solve the agency problem. It provides
no information on how managers and workers should trade off different
objectives, so will fail as an incentive mechanism, although he accepts that
it may provide useful information to managers, for example, on the com-
pany’s strategy and drivers of value.
With all these arguments against the Balanced Scorecard, why have so
many ﬁrms adopted it? Has it been an effective incentive scheme? Does
it provide useful information to managers? The rapid uptake of the Bal-
anced Scorecard has been largely fueled by high-proﬁle success stories in
other ﬁrms, yet there is little rigorous empirical evidence on how well
the scheme works.
3
In this article we exploit a quasi-experimental setting within a single
ﬁrm in order to investigate the effectiveness of the Balanced Scorecard.
The ﬁrm is a large multinational that is listed on the London Stock Ex-
change. It implemented the Balanced Scorecard in one division with the
explicit objective to see how well it would work before rolling it out
across the ﬁrm. This allows us to overcome one of the main problems in
evaluating incentive schemes—the fact that who adopts the incentive
mechanisms is endogenous—by comparing monthly performance across
a large number of branches in two different divisions within the same
ﬁrm.
4
Another advantage of our setting is that the ﬁrm initially used proﬁt-
related pay in all divisions. This means that we are able to distinguish the
impact of the particular form of incentive scheme from the general impact
of any form of performance-related pay.
2 See, inter alia, Nørreklit (2000, 2003), Jensen (2001), Cools and van Praag
(2003), Gosling (2003), and Fink (2004). There is also an earlier literature;Ridgway
(1956), e.g., criticizes the idea of multidimensional incentives schemes.
3 Hoque and James (2000) survey 66 Australian manufacturing ﬁrms; Banker,
Potter and Srinivsan (2000) look at 18 hotels; Malina and Selto (2001) consider
multiple divisions of a large ﬁrm; Ittner, Larcker, and Meyer (2003) conduct a
case study in a large ﬁrm; Burgess et al. (2004) evaluatearandomizedtrialincentive
scheme in job centers in the United Kingdom; Neely, Kennerley, and Martinez
(2004) consider 35 branches in one ﬁrm; Davis and Albright (2004) look at nine
branches of a ﬁrm.
4 Burgess et al. (2004) were able to evaluate the introduction of a team-based
multitask incentive scheme in job centers in the United Kingdom, where imple-
mentation was randomized.52 Grifﬁth/Neely
We ﬁnd that behavior changed in response to the Balanced Scorecard
but that overall this change did not lead to increased trading proﬁts be-
cause, while sales increased, costs also increased, and in some branches
the increase in costs was greater. However, the impact varied across
branches. We undertook interviews with a number of individual managers
to gain a better understanding of why this heterogeneity inresponsearose.
These interviews highlight the complexity of the Balanced Scorecard and
offer the explanation that experienced managers were better able to in-
terpret the large number of indicators than were less experienced man-
agers, and thus they were able to effectively allocate effort within the
branch. We ﬁnd empirical support for this.
The idea is that it is not only the incentives that matter but also the
ability of managers and workers to respond to them. When it is necessary
for managers and workers to perform a large number of tasks (e.g., the
tasks involved in running a retail establishment), it is important that the
manager be able to effectively decide where best to put both his and his
workers’ marginal effort. The Balanced Scorecard gives the manager ad-
ditional information on past performance, but it does not tell the manager
where additional marginal effort will be most effective. It gives the same
incentive to all measures. This has been one of the main features that has
been criticized regarding the Balanced Scorecard (Jensen 2001): it does
not tell managers where marginal effort will be the most effective in
improving performance. We interpret the fact that the more experienced
managers were able to achieve better performance under the Balanced
Scorecard as suggesting that it requires additional ability (acquired
through experience) for the manager to know where increased effort will
yield the greatest payoff.
The structure of the rest of this article is as follows. In Section II, we
describe the ﬁrm, the Balanced Scorecard, how it was implemented, and
the impact we would expect to ﬁnd. Section III describes the data and
our empirical approach. Section IV presents the results. Section V sum-
marizes and concludes.
II. The Setting
We describe the ﬁrm, the incentive scheme, and how it was designed
and implemented. We then discuss what impact we expect to see on
performance.
A. The Firm
The ﬁrm is a multinational distributor of heating and plumbing prod-
ucts. It has thousands of branches in over 10 European and North Amer-
ican countries and employs around 50,000 people. In the United Kingdom
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or brands. We use data on the largest brand in the two largest divisions.
Each brand is made up of a large number of branches. During the period
we consider, branches dealt primarily with one brand and acted as rela-
tively small trading units, employing between two and 32 staff (with a
mean of 10).
We compare performance in the dominant brand in Division 1 (where
the Balanced Scorecard was introduced) with the dominant brand in Di-
vision 2. Prior to August 2002, both divisions used the same incentive
scheme, which was based only on branch proﬁts. Division 2 kept this
scheme after August 2002. The two divisions are similar in terms of av-
erage sales and proﬁts per branch. They differ in that they sell distinct
products, but both sell products that are used in the construction industry.
Does a Division 2 branch represent a good control group for a Division
1 branch? The goods that these ﬁrms sell are bought by the same cus-
tomers—builders who buy products from Division 1 will typically also
buy products from Division 2—so the branches will experience similar
demand shocks. In fact, sinceundertakingthisanalysis,theﬁrmhasstarted
selling both sets of products in the same store. The branches operate in
similar economic conditions; for example, they employ similar people
from the same labor markets.
The largest part of ﬁrm proﬁt comes from individual branch proﬁts,
though orders are also received at head ofﬁce and head ofﬁce also re-
ceives some volume discounts from suppliers. In this study, we focus
on branch proﬁts. Proﬁts of an individual branch are the revenue earned
on the sale of each product, minus the costs of sale, minus central branch
costs. The main elements of cost at the branch level are the cost of goods
sold, labor costs, infrastructure (including capital costs), distribution,
and transport costs. Other costs include general and administration
costs, spending on information technology, local marketing, advertising,
and other branch-level administrative costs. These are described further
in the data section below.
Effort of branch staff and branch managers can affect outcomes in the
following ways:
i) The price paid for a product can vary with each transaction
(branch staff have discretiontonegotiateindividualprices,starting
from a base price).
ii) Staff deal directly with customers and thus have inﬂuence on the
quantity, type and range of products sold.
iii) Branch (as well as regional) managers inﬂuence the quantity sold
through setting base price levels, marketing, and setting special
offers.
iv) Staff and branch (as well as regional) managers’ actions can affect
hiring and ﬁring costs (through staff retention levels), volume dis-54 Grifﬁth/Neely
counts (through the type and quantity of goods sold), and various
other branch-level costs in a number of ways.
A typical branch is managed by a branch manager.
5 It has an admin-
istrator who works in the ofﬁce, two or three sales staff, a driver, and
three or four people who work in the warehouse or stockyard. Further
details are given in table 4. The role of the manager, among other things,
is to decide on hiring decisions (in conjunction with head ofﬁce), allocate
staff to tasks, decide on special offers, and decide on the level and type
of local marketing activity.
B. Performance-Related Pay in the Firm
Prior to August 2002, employees in both divisions received a bonus
that was a function of branch-level proﬁts. The bonus was allocated to
branches based on a percentage of branch proﬁts and was allocated to
branch staff by the branch manager at his discretion and in consultation
with the regional manager.
Senior management became concerned that this scheme was leading to
dysfunctional behaviors, as has been emphasized in the literature.
6 For
example, managers had incentives to adjust the timing of capital invest-
ment where they would affect bonus payments, and they faced incentives
to compete for business with other local branches because proﬁts were
calculated on a point-of-sale basis.
7 The ﬁrm was also concerned that
branch staff were not putting sufﬁcient effort into activities that enhanced
long-run proﬁtability, such as maintaining customer loyalty and relation-
ships with suppliers. Senior management decided to change the basis of
the performance measurement and incentive scheme in the organization.
The senior management decided to perform a trial of a new scheme
based on the Balanced Scorecard in Division 1 prior to rolling out that
scheme across the ﬁrm. The Balanced Scorecard wasdesignedtoovercome
the dual problems of subjective performance evaluation (which can give
rise to various forms of bias and encourage workers to waste effort to
curry favor with managers) and focusing on one key performance target
(which can lead to dysfunctional behavior with workers focusing all their
energy on tasks that are rewarded and ignoring those that are not included
in the incentive scheme).
8
The board devoted signiﬁcant time discussing what were the objectives
5 The branch manager reports to a regional manager, who reports to a brand
operations director, who reports to a brand managing director, who reports to a
divisional managing director, who reports to the board.
6 See, inter alia, reviews by Hayes and Abernathy (1980) and Prendergast (1999).
7 See, inter alia, Oyer (2004) and Larkin (2006).
8 See Argyris (1952), Ridgway (1956), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), and
Kerr (1995). For a recent review of the literature, see Prendergast (1999).Performance Pay and Managerial Experience in Multitask Teams 55
Fig. 1.—The scorecard measures
for the division, what behaviors they wanted to encourage in the branch
network, and how these behaviors might be reinforced through the choice
and design of appropriate performance measures. At various stages during
the process, the directors consulted regional and branch managers. The
ﬁrm invested considerably in education and training, as well in engage-
ment with workers at all levels throughout this time.
9 In the end, the ﬁrm
adopted 16 measures upon which to base the new performance pay
scheme. These are shown in ﬁgure 1 and further described in table 1.
10
Following a 9-month design and deployment process, the Balanced
Scorecard was introduced in August 2002. The scheme remained in op-
eration until July 2004.
The new scheme made three big changes: (i) it used multiple targets
rather than a single target; (ii) it was nondiscretionary rather than dis-
cretionary, and (iii) it provided more information to managers on a wide
range of indicators, such as customer behavior and efﬁciency, than was
previously available.
The speciﬁc scheme that the ﬁrm implemented worked as follows.
Performance of each branch was evaluated on 16 key indicators, including
both ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial indicators of performance. Branch staff
and branch managers received a bonus based on the total numberofpoints
9 The discussions were about what the objectives of the division were and who
had control over them. Meetings were held in every branch, and discussion was in
depth and focused on what individual workers could do to improve performance.
10 Personal development was included as a measure, but the data were not
adequately collected, so they were not used. The employee satisfaction survey





Return on capital employed (Proﬁts before interest and tax) / (Debtors
 Stock  Fixed Assets)
Growth in proﬁt Growth in proﬁts compared to same time
last year
PBIT (proﬁt before interest
and tax) as a % of sales
Proﬁts over sales (year to date)
Positive cash ﬂow Cash ﬂow over sales
Sales growth Growth in sales compared to same time
last year
Customer:
Customer satisfaction Score achieved via an external survey
Customer retention Growth in number of customers retained
(based on rolling 12-month measure)
Sales mix Growth in sales of selected products com-
pared to same time last year
Availability of stock range Proportion of trading days where stock
ins for minimum basic range are equal
to or greater than 90%
Internal measures:
Operational efﬁciency Index of branch performance assessed by
regional manager on four individual
branch targets relating to stock, debtors,
labor, and transport
Operational standards Score from operational standards check list
Intercompany cooperation Growth in number of customers referred
to other branches compared to same
time last year
People:
Staff retention Number of voluntary leavers as a propor-
tion of average head count (based on a
rolling 12 months)
Employee satisfaction The number of people who indicate they
are satisﬁed at work as a proportion of
the average number of employees over
the period
Communication The number of people who feel they have
been made aware of businesses activities
as a proportion of the average number
of employees over the period (measured
by region)
Supplier:
Spend with approved suppliers Purchases from preferred suppliers as a
share of all purchases from suppliers
that the branch earned in each month times the value of a point.
11 Points
were calculated and are reported on a monthly basis, but they were paid
on a 6-month basis.
11 We only consider branch proﬁts here. For regional managers, the bonus was
based on the average of the points earned in branches under their control. For
central ofﬁce staff, it was calculated based on a simpliﬁed version of the Balanced
Scorecard containing only measures that the central ofﬁce staff could affect.Performance Pay and Managerial Experience in Multitask Teams 57
Points were calculated as follows. For each of the 16 measures, each
branch is graded “green,” “amber,” or “red.” A green grade earns 3 points,
an amber grade 1.5 points, and a red grade 0 points. There are 16 measures,
so the maximum number of points a branch can earn in a month is 51.
The 16 measures are shown in table 1. For each measure, the ﬁrm
speciﬁed thresholds for obtaining a green, amber, or red grade. For ex-
ample, consider the ﬁrst measure, return on capital employed. This is
measured by proﬁt before interest and tax (PBIT) over capital employed
(debtors plus stocks plus ﬁxed assets). A value of 25% or more earned a
branch a green grade, a value of between 20% and 25% earned an amber
grade, and a value of less than 20% earned a red grade. Similar thresholds
were deﬁned for each of the other measures. Table 1 shows that the
measures are a combination of absolute targets that the ﬁrm wants all
branches to meet and a few targets that require branches to continually
improve on their own past performance (there are four measures that fall
into this latter category—growth in proﬁt, sales growth, customer reten-
tion, and intercompany cooperation).
In 2003 a point was worth £1 for branch staff (the value of a point is
higher for managers), so the maximum bonus a branch worker could earn
in a month was £51, or £612 a year. Salaries for branch workers average
around £12,000, so the maximum bonus represents around 5.1% of salary.
The total amount the ﬁrm allocated for the scheme was just under £2
million. This was set aside in a separate account to signal the ﬁrm’s com-
mitment to the scheme. The previous scheme, based on proﬁts, cost about
the same total amount.
12 As well as changing the incentive structure, an
important aspect of the Balanced Scorecard was the provision of more
detailed information on performance, and, crucially, on several leading
indicators of proﬁtability. Each branch manager received a detailed report
every month on the performance of his or her branch on each of the 16
measures.
Why did the ﬁrm implement the Balanced Scorecard in Division 1 and
not Division 2? This is an important question as our strategy for iden-
tifying the impact of the Balanced Scorecard relies on performance being
independent of this decision. The pragmatic reason is simply that the
divisions were run relatively independently and the managing director of
Division 1 was rather more keen on management innovation, particularly
on the Balanced Scorecard. At the outset, the organization considered
whether it would subsequently implement theBalancedScorecardinother
divisions, but, in essence, it decided to delay a decision and instead treat
Division 1’s implementation as a pilot study. Thus, we argue that the
12 The ﬁrm estimates the cost of implementation at around £0.5 million, in-
cluding the direct and indirect costs, such as management time.58 Grifﬁth/Neely
introduction can be treated as independent of any expectations about the
impact the Balanced Scorecard would have in one division over the other.
In evaluating the impact of the Balanced Scorecard, we need to be
careful to distinguish two questions: (i) Did the new incentive scheme
change behavior? (ii) Did this behavior lead to improved performance?
The idea behind the Balanced Scorecard is that the ﬁrm needstodetermine
what are the key drivers of future proﬁtability and build these into the
scheme.
C. Anticipated Impact on Performance
How do we expect the key changes—(i) introduction of multiple mea-
sures, (ii) move from discretionary to nondiscretionary, (iii) move from
individual to group evaluation of performance, and (iv) increased infor-
mation—to affect performance? Remember that, as mentioned above,
there was no major change in the overall value of performance-related
pay, only in its form.
In order to consider how this affects performance, we consider the
incentives that individuals faced and how they changed. We assume that
individuals seek to maximize their income, net of effort. Income consists
of a base wage and a performance-related payment. Performance is a
function of the effort of all staff, managers, and directors. Effort is costly.
Individuals will exert effort up to the point where the marginal cost of
effort equals the marginal beneﬁt in terms of the incentive payment. This
is true under either scheme. What changed is the way performance was
measured and rewarded.
The main objectives of the ﬁrm were to encourage workers to put more
effort into a broad range of activities that were previously not rewarded
but which the directors of the ﬁrm believed feed into ﬁrm-level long-
term proﬁts (long term being over several months).
13 The tasks concerned
are substitutes from the individual worker’s point of view (they each take
time and an individual worker can spend time on one task or another),
but, from the point of view of the ﬁrm and value maximization, they are
complements, in the sense that workers need to spend time on all of the
tasks in order to maximize the value of the ﬁrm. For example, a worker
can either sweep the ﬂoor or restock the shelvesfrom the worker’s point
of view, these are substitute activities. But from a customer’s point of
view, these are complementary characteristics of a shop—they want both
a clean shop and well-stocked shelves.
Where workers undertake tasks that are substitutes for each other and
13 This increase in ﬁrm performance could arise, e.g., if the activities of workers
in one branch affected the performance of another branch or if the activities of
workers in one period affected the performance of the branch in future periods.Performance Pay and Managerial Experience in Multitask Teams 59
where the rewards are equal and independent (as is the case here), workers
will devote more time to those tasks they ﬁnd easiest to perform. If the
measurement of some tasks is more precise or more clearly understood—
in the sense that it is easier to identify improvements in performance—
then workers will devote more time to those tasks that are measured more
precisely.
14 This is essentially the objection that Jensen (2001) and others
have made to performance-related pay schemes like the Balanced Score-
card—it does not give clear guidance to workers as to what is the most
important task to perform (should they spend another 10 minutes sweep-
ing the ﬂoor or should they start stocking the shelves), but rather it allows
them to put too much effort into unproﬁtable tasks (either because they
have misinformation about the payoff to the individual tasks or because
both are rewarded, so they simply do the one that is least costly).
The Balanced Scorecard scheme with 16 measures was complex, and
managers were provided with large amounts of information. In order to
effectively use this information, the manager needed to be able to assim-
ilate it and understand what it meant in terms of future performance. A
key issue is that the data presented in the Balanced Scorecard did not give
managers the information they needed to take action. Each manager
needed to be able to translate the information provided on the Balanced
Scorecard so that it told them something speciﬁc about the local situation.
For example, consider one of the measures—customer retention. Each
month the manager would be given information on how many customers
they were retaining compared to the same time last year. This is a useful
leading indicator of proﬁtability. However, simply knowing that you re-
tained 5% fewer customers than this time last year is not sufﬁcient in-
formation to enable the manager or shop workers to act. They needed
to be able to ﬁgure out which customers were not coming back and why
in order to know where to put effort that would increase retention rates.
This is where experience comes in. Our thesis, developed through inter-
views with branch managers, is that experienced managers are either more
likely to have seen in the past, or are better able now to develop, local
solutions that allowthemto takeactiontoimproveperformanceaccording
to the Balanced Scorecard. A more experienced manager will be better
able both to interpret the large number of indicators and to (e.g., more
credibly) motivate staff to put effort into the activities that matter for
performance; with an inexperienced manager, workers can easily become
overloaded with information and tasks, leading to underperformance. We
explore this idea in our empirical analysis below.
14 See Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Burgess et al. (2004).60 Grifﬁth/Neely
III. Data and Econometric Method
A. Data
The main data are drawn from the monthly proﬁt and loss accounts
of the ﬁrm. We have information at the branch level on sales, gross proﬁts
(sales minus cost of goods sold), trading proﬁts, laborcosts,infrastructure,
transport costs, general and administrative costs, information technology
(IT) investment, local marketing and advertising expenditure, and other
costs. We have these data monthly from August 1999 to July 2005. We
also have data on each employee in each branch in Division 1, including
age, job title, and length of tenure in the ﬁrm from August 2003 to July
2004.
We use the location (postcode) of each branch to match branches from
the two divisions. There are a number of factors that affect sales but that
are both exogenous (not affected by actions of the ﬁrm) and will have a
common effect across both divisions. These include the economic cycle,
local economic and labor market conditions, and other localfactors.There
may, however, be some variation in demand conditions. The productssold
by Division 1 are used both inside and outside buildings, while those sold
by Division 2 are predominantly used inside. Thus weather conditions
will have a differential effect on demand for the two goods. To control
for this, we use monthly data from 26 weather stations in the United
Kingdom on the minimum temperature (in Celsius) and rainfall (in mil-
limeters). In addition, goods sold by Division 2 are used more intensively
in reﬁtting houses, while goods sold in Division 1 are used more inten-
sively in new buildings. To control for this, we use data on total quarterly
construction activity in a range of categories to capture variation in ag-
gregate demand. These data come from the Construction Products As-
sociation. We aggregate separate information on aggregate quarterly out-
put for new private sector housing, private and public sector remodeling,
and commercial and industrial development. The ﬁrm has given us the
weight of each of these in demand for each of their brands, and we use
this to construct a measure of quarterly aggregate demand for each brand.
Tables 2 and 3 show descriptive statistics of the main variables. Table
4 shows descriptive statistics on the number of employees, types of jobs
within a branch, and the average experience and age of staff.
We match each branch from Division 1 Brand A to the geographically
nearest branch from Division 2 Brand C. The markets for the goods sold
by the ﬁrm are very local—the ﬁrm tells us that consumers are rarely
willing to travel further than 30 kilometers. There are four Division 1
branches that do not have a Division 2 branch within 30 kilometers, and
we exclude these from our analysis. Theaveragedistancebetweenmatched
branches is 4.5 kilometers.Performance Pay and Managerial Experience in Multitask Teams 61
Table 2















































Note.—Values are monthly in nominal £ thousands over the period August 1999
to July 2005. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
B. Econometric Method
Our setting allows us to adopt a quasi-experimental design method and
use a combined matching and difference-in-difference estimator.
15 As
highlighted above, a major problem in the literature that attempts to
identify the impact of incentive schemes has been the fact that organi-
zations choose whether and which incentive schemes to adopt—the adop-
tion of the incentives scheme is endogenous.
We are able to use the fact that the ﬁrm implemented the Balanced
Scorecard in one part of the ﬁrm but not the other to tackle this problem.
Differencing between the matched branches allows us to control for all
of those factors that have a similar effect on the two branches. However,
the ﬁrm has highlighted two speciﬁc factors that may affect demand for
the products sold in the two divisions differently, and we control for these
in our analysis. We believe that this intraﬁrm interdivision comparison
gives us a substantially better control group than is generally used in the
literature (where, e.g., a different ﬁrm is generally used, where the dif-
ferences between treatment and control will be much greater).
15 See, inter alia, Cook and Campbell (1979) and Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd
(1997). For a recent survey, see Blundell and Costa-Dias (2000, 2005).62 Grifﬁth/Neely
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics—Weather and Demand
Mean
Minimum temperature (in Celsius), measured at 26 points
throughout the United Kingdom
7.28
(4.17)
Rainfall (in millimeters) 65.7
(41.0)
National quarterly demand for activities using Division 1
products (in £ millions)
2,628
(200)
National quarterly demand for activities using
Division 2 products (in £ millions)
2,588
(168)
Sources.—Data on weather are from http://www.met-ofﬁce.gov.uk/climate/uk/
stationdata/. Data on quarterly demand were provided by the ﬁrm and are from industry
sources.
Note.—Standard deviations are in parentheses.
To formalize this, we can write the determinants of sales for each type
of branch,
S p a  bh  l D  ft gW  d BSC  e ,( 1 ) irt i 1 rt 11 t 1 t 1 rt t irt
S p a  bh  l D  ft g W   , (2) jrt j 2 rt 22 t 2 t 2 rt jrt
where branches within Division 1 are indexed i, branches within Division
2 are indexed j, and r indexes regions and t time (months). The variables
that we observe are S, sales; D, national demand; W, weather; and BSC,
use of the Balanced Scorecard. The time subscript on the coefﬁcient in-
dicates that we allow the impact of the Balanced Scorecard to vary over
time. This makes the speciﬁcation ﬂexible; for example, it could capture
anticipation effects that occur before the Balanced Scorecard was put in
place or it could pick up effects that last beyond the time period that the
Balanced Scorecard was in operation. We explore these issues below.
The variables that we do not observe include , whicharebranch a and a ij
ﬁxed effects that capture unobserved time-invariantbranchcharacteristics;
, which captures unobserved factors at the regional level that might hrt
vary over time, such as variation in labor market conditions, supply chain
issues, or factors that affect local levels of demand; , which is a set of t
common seasonal (monthly) effects; and , which are idiosyncratic e and 
shocks.
Omitting the branch ﬁxed effects could lead to potential bias in the
estimated effect of the Balanced Scorecard if the adoption of the Balanced
Scorecard was correlated with other unobserved branch characteristics,
such as manager quality. However, these branch dummies are time in-
variant and so will not control for any time-varying factors that are cor-
related with BSC, for example, local labor market conditions or supply
chain issues that might affect a manager’s ability to respond to the Bal-
anced Scorecard. If we are willing to assume that these local market con-Performance Pay and Managerial Experience in Multitask Teams 63
Table 4
Job Type, Number of Employees, and Average Experience
Job



































Note.—Manager: branch manager, branch manager (designate). Ofﬁce: administrative assistant, ad-
ministration supervisor, administrator, assistant branch manager, assistant depot manager, branch super-
visior, deputy manager, estimator, general clerk, typist, ofﬁce manager, secretary. Sales: contracts/sales
administrator, credit controller, goods inwards assistant, inside sales, sales supervisor, sales clerk, sales
assistant, sales negotiator, sales representative, showroom supervisor, stock controller.Driver:driver,glass
cutter/driver, warehouse assistant/driver. Warehouse/Yard: depot manager, depot manager designate,
drainage supervisor, foreman, heavy supervisor, hire assistant, ironmongery supervisor, logistics manager,
maintenance supervisor, operations manager, product supervisor, stores assistant, warehouse assistant,
yard assistant, Saturday assistant, timber supervisor, transport supervisor, warehouse supervisor, yard
manager, yard supervisor. Other: ﬁxer, machine operator, mill operative, cleaner,timbermachinist,trainee.
ditions affect the two types of branches in the same way (as arguedabove),
then . If we match each branch from Division 1 to the geograph- b p b 12
ically nearest branch from Division 2 and consider the difference between
the two branches, then these unobserved region speciﬁc characteristics
difference out.
We further assume that changes in aggregate demand feed through into
sales and proﬁts in the same way across the two branches (so that
), which means that we can include the difference in aggregate l p l 12
demand for goods sold in the two branches. This gives us:
() ( ) ( ) S  S p a  a l D  D  f  ft () irt jrt i j 1t 2t 12 t
() ( )  g  g W  d BSC  e  e , (3) 12 rt t irt jrt
which is a combined matched and difference-in-differences estimator.
To investigate the idea that there was a heterogeneous impact of the
introduction of the Balanced Scorecard, we extend this speciﬁcation to
allow the impact of the Balanced Scorecard to vary with other observable
characteristics of the branches, in particular, the level of experience of
senior staff; that is, we replace with . dd  d Experience t 1t 2ti64 Grifﬁth/Neely
Table 5
Matched/Difference-in-Difference Results on Sales, Different Time Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
November 2001 to July 2002 404
(2,382)
BSC, August 2002 to July 2004 4,538
(1,786)**
BSC, August 2002 to July 2003 3,752 8,305 8,671
(2,624) (2,435)*** (3,577)**
BSC, August 2003 to July 2004 4,992 8,903 9,216
(2,136)** (4,020)*** (4,625)**
August 2004 to July 2005 6,916 7,124
(4,872) (5,157)
Demand 25 23 50 52
(28) (30) (24)** (20)***
Minimum temperature in Celsius 1,686 1,694 1,354 1,348
(455)*** (463)*** (453)*** (455)***
Rainfall in millimeters 90 89 80 79
(16)*** (15)*** (13)*** (13)***
R
2 .15 .15 .15 .15
Note.— observations on 156 branches over the period August 1999 to July 2005. Constant Np 11,076
and month and branch dummies are included in all regressions. Dependent variable is the difference in
sales in a Division 1 branch and the geographically nearest Division 2 branch. Demand is the difference
in national demand for Division 1 products and demand for Division 2 products. BSC p Balanced
Scoreboard in use.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
IV. Results
A. The Overall Impact of the Balanced Scorecard
We start in table 5 by considering how we parameterize the BSC var-
iables. The dependent variable is the difference in sales between the
matched branches. In the ﬁrst column, we include an indicator for just
the 2 years that the incentive scheme was in place (August 2002 to July
2004), so we are comparing the level of sales in Division 1 branches with
Division 2 branches during this period with the difference in the level
before and after this period. This shows that sales in Division 1 branches
increased by an average of £4,538 per month more than Division 2
branches during the 2-year period in which the Balanced Scorecard was
in place. In column 2, we split this period in half to see if the impact was
similar across the 2 years. The reason for doing this is that we would
expect to see year-on-year increases if the scheme was successful. What
we see is that there is a signiﬁcant increase in sales in year 1, a signiﬁcant
and larger increase in year 2, and that, when use of the Balanced Scorecard
as a performance-related pay scheme is phased out, some of the gains are
sustained.
16 In column 3, we also include an indicator for the year after
the ﬁrm put the incentive scheme on hold—so we are now comparing
16 As discussed below and shown in ﬁg. 6, this is in large part because the
variance of performance increases across branches.Performance Pay and Managerial Experience in Multitask Teams 65
only to the 2 years before the Balanced Scorecard was implemented. We
now see a larger impact from the Balanced Scorecard, with a decline after
the scheme was put on hold, though perhaps not immediately back to
the original levels. In column 4, we consider whether there was an an-
ticipation effect in the initial discussion period,
17 but we ﬁnd no evidence
of this. For the remainder of this article, we stick to the parameterization
in column 3. In table 5, we also see that demand for Division 2 products
grew somewhat faster than that for Division 1 products (the coefﬁcient
on demand is negative) and that there is more demand for Division 1
products when it is hotter and less when it is raining.
These results suggest that the BalancedScorecardhadanimpactthrough
increasing sales, but what about proﬁts? In table 6, we look at how gross
proﬁts, trading proﬁts, labor costs, infrastructure expenditure, transport
costs, general and administrative costs, information technology expen-
diture, local marketing, and advertising expenditure were affected.
The ﬁrst column of table 6 repeats column 3 of table 5. All regressions
include controls for aggregated demand, the weather, month, and branch
effects. In column 2, we see that there was also a corresponding increase
in gross proﬁts (the difference between sales and gross proﬁts is the cost
of goods sold). In column 3, we see that this did not feed through into
an increase in trading proﬁts and that in fact this led to a fall in proﬁts
in the later period of, on average, £1,018. The difference between gross
and trading proﬁts is the costs considered in columns 5–9. The fall in
proﬁts arose largely because transport costs (col. 6) and labor costs in-
creased (col. 4) and, to a lesser extent, because infrastructure (col. 5) and
generaland administrativecosts(col.7)increased.TheITcosts(andOther,
not shown) actually fell.
This is the ﬁrst empirical result of this article: the Balanced Scorecard
led to an increase in sales, but costs increased by at least as much as sales
at the aggregated branch level, so there was no increase (and actually some
decrease) in proﬁts. We emphasize these results in ﬁgures 2 and 3.
To produce ﬁgure 2 we ran a regression similar to that shown in column
1 of table 6 but with a separate time dummy for each month.
18 Figure 2
shows a plot of the monthly dummies smoothed over the period shown.
The ﬁgure shows that, prior to the introduction of the Balanced Scorecard
in August 2002 (200208), the difference in sales between the Division 1
and Division 2 branches was fairly constant. After the introduction of
the Balanced Scorecard sales in Division 1, those branches grew more
17 This is what is often called a Hawthorne effect in anticipation of the actual
implementation.
18 That is, we ran a regression of the difference in the level of sales between
each Division 1 branch and its matched Division 2 branch regressed on branch

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Performance Pay and Managerial Experience in Multitask Teams 67
Fig. 2.—Sales in all Division 1 branches relative to Division 2 branches. Each line shows
the moving average of monthly time dummies estimated from a regression that includes
demand, weather, and branch dummies (so similar to that contained in col. 1 of table 6),
except where the Balanced Scorecard and monthly dummies have been replaced by 59
individual month dummies that run from August 2008 to the end of the period. The data
include 11,076 observations on 156 branches over the period August 1999 to July 2005. The
ﬁgure shows the 6-month and 12-month moving average of the 59 estimated coefﬁcients.
rapidly. When the Balanced Scorecard was put on hold, the difference in
the level of sales evened out again.
To produce ﬁgure 3 we ran a similar regression but now with the
difference in trading proﬁts as the dependent variable. The ﬁgure plots
the monthly dummies smoothed over the period shown. The ﬁgure shows
that, prior to the introduction of the Balanced Scorecard in August 2002,
the difference in trading proﬁts between the Division 1 and Division 2
Branches was declining. After the introduction of the Balanced Scorecard,
trading proﬁts in Division 1 stopped falling, but they did not grow in
the same way that sales did (this is because a number of large components
of costs grew more rapidly in Division 1 branches than in Division 2
branches). When the Balanced Scorecard was put on hold, the difference
in the level of trading proﬁts did not change.
B. Did the Balanced Scorecard Target the Right Tasks?
One important question is whether the Balanced Scorecard targeted the
right tasks, that is, tasks that would improve performance. Did branches
that improved on the nonﬁnancial aspects measured subsequently expe-
rience improved performance? Did the Balanced Scorecardcorrectlyiden-68 Grifﬁth/Neely
Fig. 3.—Trading proﬁts in all Division 1 branches relative to Division 2 branches. Each
line shows the moving average of monthly time dummies estimated from a regression that
includes demand, weather, and branch dummies (so similar to that contained in col. 1 of
table 6), except where the BSC and monthly dummies have been replaced by 59 individual
month dummies that run from August 2008 to the end of the period. The data include
11,076 observations on 156 branches over the period August 1999 to July 2005. The ﬁgure
shows the 6-month and 12-month moving average of the 59 estimated coefﬁcients.
tify the key drivers of performance? We use the data collected under the
Balanced Scorecard to distinguish between branches that successfully put
effort into improving on the nonﬁnancial measures from those that did
not. For each branch, we calculate what proportion of the total nonﬁ-
nancial points that were available they earned. This ranges from 16% to
74% and has a median value of 52%.
In table 7, we split the sample into those branches that were below and
above the median share of points earned on the nonﬁnancial measures.
In the left-hand side of table 7, we consider the change in outcomes of
those branches that either did not try—or were not able—to perform well
on the nonﬁnancial measures, and on the right-hand side, those branches
that did well on the nonﬁnancial measures. We focus on sales and trading
proﬁts.
We see large differences between the two groups. In the left-hand panel,
branches that did poorly on nonﬁnancial measures did not experience
any signiﬁcant growth in sales, but they did experience some increases in
costs, leading to reduced trading proﬁts. In contrast, those branches that
did well on the nonﬁnancial measures saw an increase in sales and tradingPerformance Pay and Managerial Experience in Multitask Teams 69
Table 7
Matched/Difference-in-Difference Results on All Variables: Comparison of
Branches on Nonﬁnancial Balanced Scorecard Measures
Branch Score on Nonﬁnancial
Balanced Scorecard below
Median
































































2 .12 .09 .21 .08
Note.—Dependent variable is the difference in variable indicated in a Division 1 branch and the
geographically nearest Division 2 branch. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the branch
level. Each regression contains 5,538 observations on 78 branches (because the sample is split in half at
the median) over the period August 1999 to July 2005. Constant, month and branch dummies, demand,
minimum temperature, and monthly rainfall are included in all regressions. Demand is the difference in
national demand for Division 1 products and demand for Division 2 products.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
proﬁts. While costs did increase in these branches,salesincreasedbymore,
resulting in higher proﬁts. Figure 4 shows a similar picture. Each dot
represents a branch. The x-axis shows the share of possible nonﬁnancial
points earned, and the y-axis shows branch proﬁts (scaled by sales). The
correlation between these is 0.66 and is statistically signiﬁcant.
These results provide some evidence that the Balanced Scorecard mea-
sures were well chosen—those branches that did well on the nonﬁnancial
performance indicators also did well ﬁnancially. But, one concern is that
this could simply be showing that good branches (or good branch man-
agers) do well on both ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial indicators. Proponents
of the Balanced Scorecard argue that giving branches an incentive to put
effort into a broader range of factors that feed into long-run performance
will lead to better performance in the long run. OpponentsoftheBalanced
Scorecard argue that giving managers and workers so many different in-
centives will lead to worse performance as individuals lose focus and put
too much effort into the easiest tasks. To investigate this, we make a
further comparison. We consider branch ﬁnancial performance prior to70 Grifﬁth/Neely
Fig. 4.—Comparison of nonﬁnancial with ﬁnancial performance during Balanced Score-
card, using proﬁts over sales rather than BSC measures. There are 156 observations (one
for each Division 1 Brand A branch); x-axis is the share that each branch earned of the
total points they could have earned on the nonﬁnancial BSC measures (customer, internal,
people, and supplier) over the period August 2002 to July 2004; y-axis is the average value
of trading proﬁts over sales for each branch over the period August 2002 to July 2004.
the Balanced Scorecard (August 1999 to July 2002) and during the Bal-
anced Scorecard (August 2002 to July 2004). We split the sample by
ﬁnancial performance in the period before the Balanced Scorecard was
introduced.
In ﬁgure 5, we show that good performance on the nonﬁnancial points
during the Balanced Scorecard led to good ﬁnancial performance after-
ward in both cases, and the relationship is stronger in those branches that
previously had performed badly than in those that previously had done
well (correlation coefﬁcient [p-value] of 0.727 [0.000] and 0.346 [0.002],
respectively).
These pictures are suggestive, but we have not controlled for any of
the local economic time-varying factors we were concerned with above.
To do this, we return to the regressions and compare performance in four
groups of branches: (1) those that did badly on ﬁnancial measures prior
to implementation of the Balanced Scorecard and who subsequently also
did badly on nonﬁnancial measures during the implementation of the
Balanced Scorecard, (2) those who did badly on ﬁnancial measures prior
to implementation and did well on nonﬁnancial during implementation,
(3) those who did well on ﬁnancial measures prior but badly on nonﬁ-Performance Pay and Managerial Experience in Multitask Teams 71
Fig. 5.—Comparison of nonﬁnancial with ﬁnancial performance during Balanced Score-
card, split by ﬁnancial performance before Balanced Scorecard. There are 156 observations
(one for each Division 1 Brand A branch); x-axis is the share that each branch earned of
the total points they could have earnedonthenonﬁnancialBSCmeasures(customer,internal,
people, and supplier) over the period August 2002 to July 2004; y-axis is the average value
of trading proﬁts over sales for each branch over the period August 2002 to July 2004. Left-
hand panel shows those branches that had below-median ratio of proﬁt to sales over the
period August 1999 to July 2002.
nancial measures during, and (4) those who did well on ﬁnancial measures
prior and well on nonﬁnancial measures during. We focus on the results
for sales and trading proﬁts.
The far-left-hand panel of table 8 shows the estimates for group 1, the
second panel for group 2, the third panel for group 3, and the far-right-
hand panel for group 4.
What we see is that branches that do well on the nonﬁnancial measures
also do well on ﬁnancial measures, regardless of whether their ﬁnancial
performance was above or below average before the introduction of the
Balanced Scorecard. In particular, thosebranchesthatpreviouslydidbadly
on ﬁnancial measures (second panel from the left in table 8) had sub-
stantially higher sales after implementation of the BSC and they had some
increase in trading proﬁts.
Consider the branches that did well ﬁnancially priortoimplementation.
Those that did badly on nonﬁnancial measures (third panel from the left
in table 8) did badly in ﬁnancial terms after implementation, while those
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To summarize, these results suggest that those branches that were suc-
cessful on the nonﬁnancial measures also did well ﬁnancially. The results
also suggest that there was heterogeneity in the effect of the Balanced
Scorecard across branches. We now turn to investigate what might explain
this heterogeneity.
C. The Importance of Experience
From a theoretical perspective, why should the impact of the Balanced
Scorecard vary by the experience of managers? Some studies have argued
that less experienced managers rely on formal measurement systems to
supplement their inexperience more than do experienced managers
(Bourne, Kennerley, and Franco 2005). Empirically, we ﬁnd the opposite,
that the more experienced the manager, the greater the impact of the
Balanced Scorecard. As an incentive scheme, there is no obvious reason
why more experienced managers should be more motivated by the in-
centive scheme than less experienced managers (if anything, we might
think the opposite, as the incentive will account for a lower share of their
total income). The consumer psychology literature makes an important
distinction between motivation, ability, and opportunity (Batra and Ray
1986; Andrews 1988; MacInnis, Moorman, and Jaworski 1991), which is
also discussed in the organization design and psychology literatures (Par-
ker and Wall 1998). This literature makes explicit the distinction between
opportunity (the freedom and scope to act), motivation (the incentives to
respond), and ability (whether an individual has the necessary skills and
capabilities to respond). The point made in both the consumerpsychology
and the organization design literatures is that the absence of any of the
above factors signiﬁcantly limits the likelihood either of action or the
impact of action. In the case of the Balanced Scorecard, it is clear that
there is an incentive for managers to act—hence, the motivation is in
place—but do they have the opportunity and the ability to act? And are
the answers to these questions affected by their experience?
To investigate this, we undertook 20 systematictelephoneinterviewswith
branch managers. The branch managers selected for interview had all been
with the ﬁrm for at least 4 years; hence, they had been in the post for the
entire period during which the Balanced Scorecardoperated.Eachinterview
lasted between 45 and 75 minutes, during which time branchmanagerswere
asked a series of questions about their experiences with the Balanced Score-
card. Initially the interviewees were asked to explain when they ﬁrst heard
about the Balanced Scorecard and what their initial reactions were to the
scheme. Next, they were asked to explain howtheyintroducedtheBalanced
Scorecard to their staff and to comment on thestaff’sreactiontothescheme.
Third, the interviewees were asked to explain how they used the Balanced
Scorecard and howthey involved theirstaffindiscussingtheresults.Fourth,74 Grifﬁth/Neely
they were asked to comment on what happened to the Balanced Scorecard
over the time it was in operation. Finally, they were asked to comment on
how they measured and managed performance in their branchestoday(post
the Balanced Scorecard).
From the interviews we found out that, while the majority of managers
interviewed were positive about the scheme, several raised issues that led
us to question whether they were able to act onthedata.Theﬁrstcommon
theme to arise was the issue of data quality: “I think one of the problems
straight away was we didn’t have the ability to measure a lot of the
measures correctly or the ﬁgures were wrong” (Branch Manager A).
The second was whether the measures were under the manager’s control:
Personally, we would discuss why it had happened and we would put an
action plan in, just a vehicle for action plan, what we could try and do to
improve the score, but there were certain measures that you couldn’tcontrol,
like your cash collection. If a customer had no money, there was absolutely
nothing you could do to encourage them to pay the bill, so that was totally
out of your control. (Branch Manager B)
Quite honestly, I used to look at the control card and I used to see the reds,
I used to see the yellows, I used to see the greens, and I knew which ones I
could inﬂuence easily. Okay, and I could do something about those, and I
would do it. The ones I couldn’t do, I just had to leave. (Branch Manager C)
Taken together, these two issues—the quality of the data and the ques-
tion of whether the measures were under the managers’ control—clearly
have an impact on a manager’s opportunity and ability to act, as well as
on their motivation to act. Poor-quality data undermine the managers’
conﬁdence in the scheme, causing them to question whether the scheme
is having a positive effect.
Interestingly, the issue of control over the measures is a factor that many
managers raised, but then some found solutions too. For example, one
experienced manager explained the local work-around that he and his team
had developed to enable him to act on the customer retention data that
other managers said they had no control over: “I mean the staff that I’ve
got on the counter have been with me for years, and they will come in and
say we haven’t seen Brian. If they tell you this bloke hasn’t been in for a
week or so, you can do something about it” (Branch Manager D).
The interview data suggest that the more experienced managers found
ways of overcoming the constraints of the Balanced Scorecard. They did
not allow constraints, such as the lack of detailed and actionable data, to
hamper their ability to act. In essence, their experience enabled them to
identify ways of overcoming these constraints.
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level of service p 6.6 years:
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2 .16 .17 .13 .13
Note.—Dependent variable is the difference in variable indicated in a Division 1 branch and the
geographically nearest Division 2 branch. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the branch
level. observations on 156 branches over the period August 1999 to July 2005. Constant, Np 11,076
month and branch dummies, demand, minimum temperature, and monthly rainfall are included in all
regressions. Demand is the difference in nationaldemand forDivision1productsanddemandforDivision
2 products.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
better able to utilize the information in the Balanced Scorecard. The num-
ber of interviews was not sufﬁcient to allow us to analyze the response
systematically. Instead, we used information from the ﬁrm’s payroll sys-
tem. We used information on the years of experience of staff in each
branch to look at whether more experienced workers, and in particular
more experienced managers, responded better to the Balanced Scorecard.
In table 9, we allow the impact of the Balanced Scorecard to vary with
the average years of experience of all staff and of senior staff. Before
considering these results, we note that a simple correlation in the data is
consistent with the idea that the more experienced managersachievebetter
performance. The correlation between years of managerial experience and
proﬁts is 0.36 (signiﬁcant at the 1% level).
Turning to the results, in the ﬁrst and second columns of table 9, we
see that experience matters. A branch with staff with the average years76 Grifﬁth/Neely
of experience (6.6 years) will have a higher level of sales after the Balanced
Scorecard was introduced than a branch with all new staff. In the third
and fourth columns, we look at trading proﬁts and show that it is the
years of experience of senior staff that matters most. A branch with senior
staff with the average years of experience (11.3 years) will have a higher
level of trading proﬁts after the Balanced Scorecard was introduced than
a branch with all new senior staff.
In results not shown (available from the authors on request), weinclude
the average age of all staff and of senior staff interacted with the Balanced
Scorecard indicators and show that it is experience, not age, that is im-
portant. Also in results not shown (available from the authors on request),
we show that, if we simply split the sample on whether the manager has
more or less than 10 years experience (approximately the median), we see
all of the effect of the Balanced Scorecard in the greater-than-10-years-
experience group.
19
Because this is a key result of this article, we illustrate it further with
two ﬁgures. In ﬁgure 6, we plot the monthly dummies (smoothed over
12 months) from a regression of difference in the level of sales between
each Division 1 branch and its matched Division 2 branch, including
branch ﬁxed effects, seasonal ﬁxed effects, and weather. The dotted line
is the same as appears in ﬁgure 1. The top line (long dashes) is for branches
where the senior staff have an above-average level of experience. The
middle dotted line shows the smoothed dummies when we use all
branches. The lower solid dark line shows the smoothed dummies when
we estimate using just branches where the senior staff have a below-
average level of experience.
The ﬁgure shows that, prior to the introduction of the Balanced Score-
card in August 2002 (200208), the difference in sales between Division 1
and Division 2 branches was fairly constant for all groups, with branches
with more experienced senior staff having a higher relative level of sales.
After the introduction of the Balanced Scorecard, sales in Division 1
branches with more experienced senior staff grew more rapidly, while
sales in branches with less experienced senior staff did not. When the
Balanced Scorecard was put on hold, the difference in the level of sales
evened out in all groups. What is very noticeable from this ﬁgure is that
the variance in sales performance across branches increased substantially
after the introduction of the Balanced Scorecard.
Figure 7 repeats this exercise for trading proﬁts. The ﬁgure shows that,
19 The coefﬁcients (standard errors) on the Balanced Scorecard variables are for
the branches with managers with less than 10 years experience: (August 2002 to
July 2003) 206 (968); (August 2003 to July 2004) 70 (847); (August 2004 to July
2005) 1,850 (796); for the branches with managers with more than 10 years
experience: (August 2002 to July 2003) 1,854 (896); (August 2003 to July 2004)
2,218 (846); (August 2004 to July 2005) 1,339 (709).Performance Pay and Managerial Experience in Multitask Teams 77
Fig. 6.—Sales in all Division 1 branches relative to Division 2 branches, split by level of
experience of senior staff. Each line shows the moving average of monthly time dummies
estimated from a regression similar to that in column 2 of table 9, except where the BSC
and month dummies have been replaced by 59 individual month dummies that run from
August 2008 to the end of the period. The data include 11,076 observations on 156 branches
over the period August 1999 to July 2005. The ﬁgure shows the 12-month moving average
of the 59 estimated coefﬁcients.
prior to the introduction of the Balanced Scorecard in August 2002
(200208), the decline in the relative level of trading proﬁts between Di-
vision 1 and Division 2 branches was in branches with less experienced
senior staff. After the introduction of the Balanced Scorecard, trading
proﬁts in branches with more experienced senior staff grew more rapidly,
while trading proﬁts in branches with less experienced senior staff con-
tinued to fall. When the Balanced Scorecard was put on hold, the differ-
ence in the level of trading proﬁts evened out in all groups.
V. Summary and Conclusions
Our results suggest that the Balanced Scorecard had some impact and
that this impact varied signiﬁcantly by branch. Sales increased on average
across all branches, but costs increased by at least as much, so while gross
proﬁts did increase, trading proﬁts for the business as a whole did not
increase. There is signiﬁcant variation in the impact. When we separate
those branches that perform well on nonﬁnancial measures from those
that perform poorly on nonﬁnancial performance measures, we ﬁnd that
the ﬁrst group—those that perform well on nonﬁnancial measures—ex-
perience statistically signiﬁcant increases in sales,grossproﬁts,andtrading
proﬁts. One potential explanation of this ﬁnding is that branches that78 Grifﬁth/Neely
Fig. 7.—Trading proﬁt in all Division 1 branches relative to Division 2 branches, split
by level of experience of senior staff. Each line shows the moving average of monthly time
dummies estimated from a regression similar to that in column 2 of table 9, except where
the BSC and month dummies have been replaced by 59 individual month dummies that
run from August 2008 to the end of the period. The data include 11,076 observations on
156 branches over the period August 1999 to July 2005. The ﬁgure shows the 12-month
moving average of the 59 estimated coefﬁcients.
perform well on nonﬁnancial measures and ﬁnancial measures are simply
well managed. Note that we are allowing for each branch to have a dif-
ferent average level of performance (we include branch ﬁxed effects). To
consider this further, we split the sample into branches that perform rel-
atively well and those that perform relatively poorly on ﬁnancial measures
in the preimplementation period. We then explore whether there are dif-
ferences in nonﬁnancial and ﬁnancial performance in the implementation
period. We ﬁnd that, regardless of prior performance, branches that per-
form well on nonﬁnancial measures also perform well on ﬁnancial mea-
sures. This ﬁnding is particularly important, as it suggests that the Bal-
anced Scorecard, when implemented correctly and adopted by the
branches, has a positive impact on branch performance in terms of sales,
gross proﬁt, and net proﬁt.
We then show that years of experience is an important factor in ex-
plaining these differences in performance. More experienced managers
were able to improve performance. We interpret this as suggesting that
the information content of the Balanced Scorecard is what is important,
not the incentive per se.
Crucially, the research reported in this article suggests that multi-Performance Pay and Managerial Experience in Multitask Teams 79
dimensional performance measurement systems can have a positive im-
pact on a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial performance providing that the measures and
the associated data are presented in a way that enables managers and
staff to act on them. It is not enough to introduce an incentive scheme
that relates to the measures—the incentive scheme also needs to be ac-
companied by data that are meaningful to those who have to manage and
improve performance. Too often, when performance measurement sys-
tems and associated incentive schemes are introduced, they are not de-
signed to enable staff at the front line to take action. The schemes are
too complex and contain data that are not sufﬁciently disaggregated to
enable action to be taken. Determining how to design measurement and
incentive schemes conﬁgured for action is a signiﬁcant challengeforfuture
research.
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